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Abstract
In this paper, we exploit the exogenous rise of Chinese imports in US to investigate the
e¤ect of import competition on crime at county level. Our results indicate that counties
with high exposure to Chinese import competition are with high crime rates while the
exposure e¤ect on property crime is much larger than that for violent crime: one standard
deviation increase of exposure will increase 2.1 more violent crimes in the county while
such increase of exposure will cause 26.5 more property crimes. Interestingly, we nd
that the crime impact of exposure to Chinese import competition disappears in counties
with high government transfer.
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1 Introduction
Chinese imports account for a dominant portion of US imports from low-income countries. For
example, during 2000-2007, China accounts for 89 percent of the import growth of US from
low-income countries. Noticeably, this increase of Chinese imports happened within a short
time horizon, see, Figure 1. This sharp increase of imports from China is usually explained by
Chinas own institutional reform and its accession into WTO, i.e., supply driven. Using this
supply shock as a source of exogenous variation, several studies have documented that Chinese
import competition cause higher unemployment, lower labor force participation, earnings losses,
and explain a large part of employment sag in U.S. during 2000s (see, e.g., Autor, Dorn, and
Hanson, 2013; Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song, 2014; Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and
Price, forthcoming; Pierce and Schott, 2015).1 Most saliently, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013)
consider unemployment, wage reduction, and rising labor adjustment costs, caused by Chinese
import competition, as Syndromein US.
In this paper, following the logic of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), we consider another
aspect of "Syndrome" caused by Chinese import competition, US crime. Crime is considered to
be a major issue in US, which costs victims $200 billion per year while the cost in reducing it is
equally large (Miller, Cohen, and Rossman, 1993; Levitt, 1997). Figure 2 presents time series
of seven crime categories in US. We see that over 1990-2010 period, there is an accelerated
decrease of crime in all of seven crime categories.2 However, we nd that around 2001, the
speed of decrease slows down which coincide with Chinas accession to WTO. Combined with
data pattern shown in Figure 1, it seems that the movement of Chinese imports and the trend
of crime rate tracked each other after 2000.
To ensure that the seemly positive time series correlation between US crime and Chinese
import competition is indeed causal, we employ the identication strategy developed by Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2013) to investigate, i.e., Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). First, our key
independent variable, county exposure to Chinese import competition, is constructed using
1These empirical evidences are consistent with the prediction of specic factor model that groups who are
"stuck" in import- competing sector loss after trade liberalization.
2Donohue and Levitt (2001) provide evidences showing that legalized abortion could be an important reason
behind the sharp decline of crime during 1990s.
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county industry structure obtained from County Business Patterns (CBP) and industry specic
Chinese imports of U.S. from UN Comtrade for 2000-2010 period. Second, to isolate the
exogenous variation of county exposure to Chinese import competition, we use lag one decade
county industry structure and Chinese imports of other eight developed countries to construct
our instrument. The underlying logic is that the rising Chinese imports of US is driven by the
economic rise of China due to its internal institutional reforms and WTO accession in 2001.
Arguably, this is a supply shock to US domestic demand market and can be regarded as an
exogenous phenomenon.
Combining county exposure to Chinese import competition measure with crime data ob-
tained from FBI and other covariates found to be important in a¤ecting crime, we nd that
there exists positive and signicant e¤ect of county exposure to Chinese import competition on
both violent- and property- crime. Perhaps more important, we nd that the exposure e¤ect
on property crime is about 11 times larger than that for violent crime. One standard deviation
increase of exposure will increase 2.1 more violent crimes in the county while such increase of
exposure will cause 26.5 more property crimes.
The exclusion restriction implied by our 2SLS estimation is that, conditional on the covari-
ates included in the regression, our instrument does not have a direct impact on US county
crime rates, other than its inuence through county exposure to Chinese import competition.
The major concern with this condition is that developed countries during our sample periods
may experience demand shocks that coincide with Chinese goods supply shock, in which case
we could overestimate the coe¢ cient of our interest. We nd that controlling for the two ma-
jor demand shocks in developed countries during our sample period, i.e., housing booms and
technological change, our main results remain robust. To further corroborate the condition
of exclusion restriction, we conduct a falsication test by regressing current county crime on
future county exposure to Chinese import competition in various periods. For example, we ex-
pect that counties that only became strongly exposed to Chinese import competition in 2000s
should not have seen di¤erential increases in crimes in the 1990s. In all cases, we did not detect
any positive exposure impacts on crime.
We document that our results are not a¤ected by the specic sample period in consideration
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and industries in which China have a comparative advantage. Also, our results are robust by
controlling for the US exports to China. Cross-category analysis on crime indicates that our
baseline results are mainly driven by exposure e¤ects on Burglary and Larceny.
Additional analysis on heterogeneous response suggests that government transfer in counties
with high Chinese import competition could e¤ectively reduce the propensity of crime of citizens
with high life pressure. For example, our subsample analysis show that e¤ect of county exposure
to Chinese import competition on crime remain positive for counties below government transfer
sample mean while exposure e¤ect disappears for counties above government transfer sample
mean.
Our paper is related to recent studies on the e¤ect of Chinese import competition and
unemployment (Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price, forthcoming; Autor, Dorn, and
Hanson, 2013; Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song, 2014; ; Pierce and Schott, 2015). However, our
paper goes one step further by considering the behavior of these a¤ected workers, i.e., crime.
The causal link between Chinese import competition and crime detected in this study
complements the literature examining the e¤ect of unemployment on crime (see, e.g., Gould,
Weinberg, and Mustard, 2002; Deiana, 2015). However, we focus on the life pressure imposed
by Chinese import competition rather than unemployment. In this regard, our paper is more
related to Dix-Carneiro, Soares, and Ulyssea (2015) who also emphasize the exposure e¤ect on
crime, but use a di¤erent source of exogenous variation and Brazil as the empirical setting.
Broadly, our work is related to public nance literature on redistribution (see, e.g., Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson, 2013). In particular, we provide evidences showing that redistribution
policies could be an e¤ective way in alleviating adverse e¤ects caused by import competition.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our identication strategy following Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2013). Section 3 describes the data sets and variable used in the paper.
Section 4 presents our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Identication Strategy
2.1 Constructing County Exposure to Chinese Import Competition
(Key Independent Variable)
Our regressor of interest concerns each US countys exposure to Chinese imports. However,
as the data of Chinese imports do not have the breakdown for each countys consumption,
we follow Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013)s approach, which extracts information of regional
import exposure from the total Chinese imports through the use of regional variations in
industry employment structure. More specically, the change in the county-level exposure to
Chinese import competition is expressed as follows,
Exposurec = ln
"X
j
Ljc2000
Lj2000
import
US_China
j
Lc2000
#
where Ljc2000 is the total employment of industry j in county c in 2000; Lj2000 is the national
total employment of industry j in 2000; Lc2000 is the total employment in county c in 2000;
import
US_China
j2000_2010  importUS_Chinaj2010  importUS_Chinaj2000 is the change of U.S. imports from China
in industry j from 2000 to 2010. A higher value of Exposurec3 indicates greater exposure to
Chinese import competition.
For robustness checks, we experiment two alternative measures of trade exposure, that
is, net imports exposure and exposure to imports from other low-income countries. The rst
alternative measure is to take into account the fact that U.S. exports to China bring job oppor-
tunities and tax revenues, which in turn inuence citizens welfare, US Net ImportsChinac =
US ImportsChinaj  US ExportsChinaj . The second alternative measure is to nd out whether
the e¤ect of US exposure to Chinese import competition is di¤erent from imports from other
low-income countries, US ImportsLowWagej .
3Please note that to mitigate the inuence of extreme exposure at county level, we take a log for country
exposure. However, our result remains robust without the log transformation.
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2.2 Estimating Equation
To examine the impact of county exposure to Chinese import competition on crime, our baseline
estimating equation is
crimec = 0 + Exposurec + y
0
c + X
00
c  + "c; (1)
wherecrimec denotes the di¤erence of crime for county c between 2000 and 2010. Exposurec
captures the change in exposure of county c to Chinese import competition over 2000-2010 pe-
riod. The coe¢ cient of our interest is . If county exposure to Chinese import competition
do trigger large life pressure for citizens living in the county, we should see a positive and
signicant estimate of , i.e., counties with higher exposure to Chinese import competition
experienced an increase of crime during 2000-2010 period.
y0c is the initial level of crime in county c, which is included to capture persistence in crime
and also possible mean-reverting dynamics, i.e., regions with high crime rate in the initial
period are less likely to have high crime rate increase during the period (e.g., Barro, 1991;
Higgins, Levy, Young, 2006). To alleviate the concern of omitted variable bias in estimating
, we control for a vector county attributes X0c that may be correlated with both county
exposure and crime, including number of police o¢ cers (Levitt, 1997; Chaln and McCrary,
forthcoming), unemployment rate (see, e.g., Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard, 2002; Deiana,
2015; Dix-Carneiro, Soares, and Ulyssea, 2015), percentage of population aged between 18-25,
percentage of black population (Levitt, 1997), percentage of population with bachelor degree,
income per capita, government welfare spending (Levitt, 1997), and total population (Levitt,
2002). For details on all the relevant variables, please refer to Appendix Table A. "c indicates
the error term, containing all the unobserved factors..
In the baseline analysis, we investigate the e¤ect of change in county exposure to Chinese
import competition between 2000 and 2010, a period with signicant increases in Chinese
imports largely due to Chinas accession intoWTO. In subsequent specications, we experiment
several alternate time period intervals to investigate the robustness of our baseline results, e.g.,
2000 to 2006 and 2000 to 2008.
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Here, we choose a long period, 2000-2010, for our baseline analysis mainly motivated by
Barro-type equation (Barro, 1991) and the construction of county exposure to Chinese import
competition (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013).
2.3 Identication
Our identication of  requires that county exposure to Chinese import competition is exoge-
nous, conditional on other controls y0cs, X
00
cs, in equation (1). This is plausible, since the main
variation of county exposure to Chinese import competition comes from the growth of US im-
ports from China, which is largely driven by the unexpected sharp growth of Chinese economy
(triggered by internal institutional reform rather than the inuence of other economies) and the
change of trade policies (Chinas accession into WTO). In other words, conditional on county
industry structure, Exposurecs is exogenous if US imports from China are largely driven by
supply shocks.
However, if regions with larger crime growth potential experience more exposure to Chinese
import competition (reverse causality), our estimate of  would be biased upwards. Perhaps
more important, if there are some unobserved factors that a¤ect USs demand on Chinese
products, our estimate of  could be contaminated (e.g., productivity shocks that positively
a¤ect manufacturersdemand on intermediate goods or the change of consumerspreferences).
To resolve these problems, we utilize the plausible instrument developed by (Autor, Dorn,
and Hanson, 2013) to isolate the exogenous variation of county exposure to Chinese import
competition.
More specically, to the extent that the rise in U.S. imports from China is driven by the
supply side (i.e., Chinas internal institutional reform or falling global trade barriers), US
imports from China should be highly correlated with imports of other developed countries4
from China but uncorrelated with internal crime of US. More specically, our rst instrument
is constructed as
4Following Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), we select Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New
Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland as our other eight other developed countries.
7
IVc = ln
"X
j
L1990jc
L1990j
Imports
Other_China
j
L1990c
#
where L1990jc denotes total employment of industry j in county c in 1990; L
1990
j represents
the national total employment of industry j in 1990; L1990c is the total employment in county
c in 1990; importOther_Chinaj  importOther_Chinaj2010   importOther_Chinaj2000 is the change of U.S.
imports from China in industry j from 2000 to 2010. Here, we use ten-year-lagged county
employment structure to mitigate the concern that county industry structure could be a¤ected
by the aticipation of US-China trade (i.e., simultaneity bias).
This instrument is less e¤ective if the increase in U.S. and other countriesimports from
China are driven by the same demand shocks across developed countries. We mitigate this
concern in two ways: rst, we recomputed importUS_Chinaj and Imports
Other_China
j by ex-
cluding steel, at glass, and cement industries which were in large demand a¤ected by developed
countrieshousing booms during 2000-2010 period; second, to excluding the inuence of tech-
nology shocks in developed countries, we construct Exposurecs and IVc without industry
computer. As an additional robustness test, we drops three industries in which China has a
strong comparative advantage: apparel, footwear and textiles.
The validity of our instrumental-variables strategy depends on two assumptions. First, our
instruments should be correlated with Exposurecs. Figures 3A and 3B display correlations
between our instruments and the potential endogenous variable Exposurecs. The positive
correlation between IV 1c and Exposurecs shown in Figure 3A suggests that supply-driven
imports from China in US is correlated with imports from China in other developed countries.
This correlation is in line with our intuition. We will test the signicance of these relationships
in section 4.1. Though signicant, if our instruments can only explain a small portion of the
variation of Exposurecs, our estimate of  could be biased toward OLS estimate. We thus
reply on Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic, Shea Partial R Square, and Stock-Yogo test
to check whether our instrument su¤ers from weak instrument problem (Bound, Jaeger, and
Baker, 1995, Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002). Second, the exclusion
restriction implied by our instrumental-variables strategy is that, conditional on the covariates
included in the regression, our instruments should have no direct e¤ect on county crime rate,
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other than through county exposure to Chinese import competition. Since this instrument
has been widely recognized and used in the literature (see, e.g., Feigenbaum and Hall, 2015;
Balsvik, Jensen, and Salvanes, 2015; Dippel, Gold, and Heblich, 2015) and the economic rise
of China is mainly via internal institutional reforms, it is plausible that it does isolate the
exogenous variation of county exposure. As a nal experiment, we will conduct Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test to check whether di¤erence between 2SLS and OLS estimate are statistically
signicant enough to state the endogeneity of Exposurecs.
Throughout the paper, whites standard errors are reported to control for arbitrary het-
eroskedasticity.
3 Data Sets
To construct the regressor of our interest (county exposure to Chinese import competition),
we need to get information on county industry structure and Chinese imports by industry.
We obtain number of employees by industry-county cell from County Business Pattern (CBP,
http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/download/index.htm). Although CBP provides such data
since 1986, we select 2000-2010 as our sample period5 which corresponds to the major era of
economic rise of China. Since O¢ ce of Management and Budget (OMB) switches industry
codes on recording USA business economy every ve years (i.e., years that end with "2" or
"7"), following Autor, Dorn, and Hansen (2013), we convert industry-county employment coded
by NASIC to SIC.6 During our sample period, county boundary rarely changes, therefore, we
do not need to make any adjustment for Census Bureau county id.7 With these information
5However, we use other sample periods to conduct robustness checks and nd that our baseline results are
preserved.
6In CBP, SIC87 industry code is used for 1992-1997 period; NAICS97 industry code is used for 1998-2002
period; NAICS02 is used for 2003-2006 period. We need to have a common industry code, which is achieved with
the following two steps: step 1, we convert NAICS07 to NAICS02 and NAICS02 to NAICS97 using concordance
table provided by Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances). For example, if one
NAICS02 code is split into two or more NAICS97 codes, we assume the employment for the 02 code is split
equally among the 97 codes; step 2, we convert NAICS97 to SIC87 using cross walk provided by Autor, Dorn,
and Hanson (2013). Autor, Dorn, and Hanson uses 1997 census "bridge" le to create a weight for NAICS97
code to be split into two or more SIC87 codes (http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97brdg/). In this way, we have
a consistent industry code SIC87 across years. For details, please refer to Autor, Dorn, and Hansen (2013).
7Dade county, Florida (FL): in 1997, Dade county changes name to Miami-Dade. FIPS code is changed
from 12025 to 12086. Skagway-Yakutat-Angoon Census Area, Alaska (AK): after Yakutat was incorporated
as a unied city-borough on September 22, 1992, it was renamed as Skagway-Hoonah-Angoon Census Area.
When Skagway followed suit on June 20, 2007, the census area assumed its current name, HoonahAngoon
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at hand, we can construct county industry structure for the regressor of our interest, i.e.,
Exposurec.
We obtain US imports from China on UN Comtrade (http://comtrade.un.org/), which
provides bilateral imports at HS-6 digit level. Following Pierce and Schott (2015) and Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2013), we convert HS codes used to classify imported products to SIC
industry codes used to classify domestic economic activity. Here, all imports are inated
to 2007 USD using Personal Consumption Expenditure deator from Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA, http://www.bea.gov/). In UN Comtrade, we also extract imports of other
eight developed countries8 from China, imports of US from other low income countries9, and
imports of US from Mexico. Combining these information with county industry structure, we
can construct regressors of our interest and the related instrument.
Our key dependent variable, country crime rate, is extracted from Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR) issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The crime data includes seven types
of crime: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, assault, robbery, burglary,
larceny, and motor vehicle theft. Following Levitt (1997), we consider rst four types crime as
violent crime while the last three as property crime. The raw crime data is available at U.S.
reporting agency level. To match up with the county exposure and other control variables,
we aggregate the original agency level crime to county level, from 1991 to 2010. Finally,
following Levitt (1997), we use category specic crime per 100,000 populations in the county
for standardization.
In the regression, we include a variety of controls that are found to be important in ex-
Census Area. South Boston city, Virginia (VA): in 1960, it became an independent city by court order. South
Boston became a town again and rejoined Halifax County on July 1, 1995. Yakutat Borough, Alaska (AK): it
is incorporated as a non-unied Home Rule Borough on September 22, 1992. Yakutat was previously a city in
the Skagway-Yakutat-Angoon Census Area. Clifton Forge city, Virginia (VA): this independent city becomes a
town of in Alleghany County in 2001. Broomeld County, Colorado (CO): it becomes a county in On November
15, 2001.
8Following Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), they are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New
Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland.
9Following Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), low-income countries are: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Burma, Cambodia, Central African
Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia,
Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, India, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, Maldives,
Mali, Malawi, Mauritania, Moldova, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam,
and Yemen.
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plaining US crime rates in the literature. Previous studies have uncovered that police hiring
is an e¤ective way in reducing crime in US (see, e.g., McCrary, 2002; Chaln and McCrary,
forthcoming). To control this, we include police per capita (both sworn and civilian o¢ cers)
in the regression, where the data is also from FBI UCR. Following Levitt (1997), we also con-
trol for percentage of population aged between 18 and 25, black, and citizens with bachelor
degree, where these controls are from US Census Bureau. Unemployment has been proved to
be an important determinant of crime in the literature (e.g., Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard,
2002). We control for this by constructing unemployment rate10 from US Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). To mitigate simultaneous police hiring due to electoral cycles, we control for
government welfare spending following Levitt (1997). Following Levitt (2002), we construct
income per capita at county level using total income and population obtained from Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). Finally, total population is included in the regression to mitigate
the inuence of the size of the county (Levitt, 2002).
Figure 2 illustrates the intensity of county exposure to Chinese import competition between
2000 and 2010, with a darker shade corresponding to greater exposure. It is apparent that
there is a large variation of county exposure to Chinese import competition at the county level.
Moreover, we nd that east of US su¤er more from Chinese import competition, possible due
to its concentration on labor intensive industries, e.g., toys, clothes, furniture.
Table 1 documents summary statistics of variables used in the baseline regression. In Table
1A, observations, mean, standard deviation, min and max are provided for all variables. Totally,
we have 3059 out of 3141 counties in the sample and missing counties are either due to the
change of county boundary during 2000-2010 period or missing values on crime rate or county
exposure. We nd that average county crime rate change during 2000-2010 period is -0.98,
with a standard deviation of 21.55 for violent crime and -9.98 with a standard deviation of
107.12 for property crime, suggesting that crime rate is decreasing in the whole country during
our sample period. To ease the illustration of estimated coe¢ cients, log of county exposure is
multiplied by 100. Here, we are more interested in the association between county exposure
to Chinese import completion and county crime. To explore this, we report subsamples with
10Ratio of unemployed to labor forces in the county.
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top and bottom 20% of county exposure to Chinese import competition in Tables 1B and 1C,
respectively. Obviously, the decreasing rate of crime is signicantly lower for countries with high
exposure to Chinese import competition (0.43 for violent crime and -3.33 for property crime)
than those for counties with lower exposure (-1.52 for violent crime and -15.57 for property
crime). This observation is consistent with the story that Chinese import competition exert
signicant life and work pressure on citizens in counties with large exposure, which in turn
leads to higher crime rate in these counties. We would test this relationship formally in the
next section.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 First Stage Estimates
Before presenting 2SLS estimates, we rst report our rst stage estimation results in Table 2
and check the validity of our instruments.
Columns 1 and 2 report rst stage estimates for violent and property crime respectively.
In both columns, we include all the relevant controls in the second stage regression. Note
that the only di¤erence between controls in columns 1 and 2 is the initial period crime. We
nd that the estimate of IVc is positive and signicant in both columns, 0.230 with standard
error of 0.013. According to this estimate, one standard deviation increase of other developed
countriesimports from China will cause 0.44 standard deviation increase of county exposure
to Chinese import competition in U.S. This results suggests that Chinese imports of other eight
developed countries is positively related to Chinese imports of U.S., suggesting the usefulness
of this instrument (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013; Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song, 2014;
Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price, Forthcoming).
Does our instrument have high predictive power to Exposurec? The Shea Partial R
square reported in both columns indicate that IVc account for 19 percent of the variation of
Exposurec, which seem to be not trivial (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). This re-
sult suggests that our instrument do explain a large variation of the endogenous variable. Also,
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic implies that we can reject the null hypothesis of underidenti-
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cation of our equation at 1 percent level. By allowing 10% percent bias of our IV estimates,
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic safely pass the critical value suggested by Stock and Yogo
(2005). All in all, our rst stage estimate suggest that, there exists positive and signicant
correlation between IV and exposure and this estimate does not su¤er from weak instrument
problem.11
4.2 Second Stage Estimation Results (Baseline Results)
Estimates of equation (1), with dependent variable being either violent crime or property crime,
are reported in Table 3. The rst three columns are results for violent crime while the remaining
columns report estimation results for property crime. In column 1 and 4, we report univariate
regression by including only exposure in the estimating equation. Column 2 and 5 further add
initial period crime while column 3 and 6 contain all of our baseline covariates.
In column 1, the estimated coe¢ cient for county exposure to Chinese import competition
is positive and signicant, 0.057 with a standard error of 0.029. This is consistent with our
hypothesis that due to the work and life pressure imposed by competition, counties with high
Chinese import competition during our sample period are more likely to have high violent
crime rate. According to this estimate, a one standard deviation increase of exposure will
increase 0.1 standard deviation of violent crime on average in US counties. If we look at the
result in column 4, we get the same message: counties with high exposure to Chinese import
competition experienced an increase of property crime. However, we nd that the e¤ect of
exposure is 10 times larger for property crime than for violent crime, 0.631 vs. 0.057. This
result is intuitive because once unemployment rate is controlled for, citizenspressure due to
Chinese import competition are mainly from nancial side, e.g., lower cumulative earnings,
job relocation, and facing elevated risk of obtaining public disability benets (Autor, Dorn,
and Hanson, 2013; Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song, 2014). Although murder, rape, and other
violent crimes are not impossible due to nancial pressure, property crime is main channel
through which citizens temporarily getting relief. In section 4.5, we will see that in the violent
11We also use weak-instrument-robust estimator, Limited-Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML), to check
the robustness of our results. We actually nd that our estimates are not inuenced by weak instrument problem.
These results are available upon request.
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crime regression, robbery is the main category driving the signicant e¤ect of exposure.
In columns 2 and 5, initial period crime rate is further added as control. The estimates
of  for both violent crime and property crime become larger, but they are still positive and
signicant at 1 percent level. In columns 3 and 6, all of our baseline controls is added in the
regression. We nd that exposure still exert positive and signicant e¤ect on both types of
crime and its impact on property crime is much larger than on violent crime: one standard
deviation increase of exposure will increase 2.1 violent crime in the county while such increase
of exposure will cause 26.5 more property crime, which is 11.6 times larger.
Is the instrumental-variables estimation necessary? To check this, we examine the null
hypothesis of indi¤erence between OLS and 2SLS estimates using Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
(DWH). The results in columns 3 and 6 show that we can reject the null hypothesis at 1 percent
level, suggesting that it is necessary to employ our identication strategy. In later parts of the
paper, we consider specications in columns 3 and 6 as our baseline model speciation.
4.3 Falsication Test
Our interpretation of estimate of  is causation running from exposure to crime rate. However,
if there are some underlying factors trending crime rate, exposure as well as our instrument
together, our key estimate could be biased upwards. To alleviate this concerns, following Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2013), we conduct a falsication exercise by regressing crime rate change
on future change of county exposure to Chinese import competition.
The estimation results are reported in Table 4. The key independent variable is county
exposure to Chinese import competition between 2000 and 2010 while dependent variable in
columns 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6 are change of crime rate for 1992-2010, 1994-2000, and 1996-2000
period, respectively. In all cases, we do not nd any signicant positive e¤ect of future exposure
on Chinese import competition on crime rates. This falsication test alleviates our concern
that omitted factors, if any, may invalidate our identication strategy.
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4.4 Checks on IV Validity
Key to the validity of our instrument is that Chinese imports of other eight developed coun-
tries are also Chinese supply driven. However, if there are some demand shocks occurring in
all developed countries, our estimate of  could be biased. To alleviate this concern, following
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), we drop industries that may be causing this problem. First,
since many rich countries during our sample period experienced housing booms, which induces
large demand for construction material, we drop steel, at glass, and cement industries in our
regression. The estimation results are reported in columns 1-2 of Table 5. We nd that this
exercise does not a¤ect our main results qualitatively. Another industry that is causing similar
demand structure of developed countries is computer. During the past 15 years, processing
trade has render China become the world manufacturing factory, where computer industry
accounts for a large portion (assembly). If technology advancement increases demand for com-
puters in developed countries, computer industry could bias our estimates upwards. Estimation
results by dropping computer industry are reported in columns 3-4. It shows that there still
exist positive and signicant e¤ect of county exposure to Chinese import competition on crime
and its impact is much larger for property crime than for violent crime. There two sets of
results combined show that our instrument plausibly isolates the exogenous variation of county
exposure and our baseline estimates are reliable.
4.5 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we check the robustness of our baseline results and address a variety of
concerns to our baseline specication.
Alternative Sample Periods: in our main results, we take a long di¤erence for 2000-2010
period following Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013). One may be worried that if the short- or
median- run e¤ect of county exposure to Chinese import competition evolve in a non-monotonic
way, our estimates may mask this feature (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). To check for this, we
report estimation results for other alternative sample periods in Table 6. The rst two columns
report estimation result for 2000-2008 period while columns 3-4, column 5-6, and columns 7-
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8 are results for 2000-2006, 2000-2004, and 2000-2002 respectively. We nd that in all cases,
there exists positive and signicant e¤ect of exposure to both types of crime and exposure e¤ect
on violent crime is signicantly smaller than on property crime, which is consistent with our
baseline result. Interestingly, the shorter the period in consideration, the smaller the exposure
e¤ect on crime. This suggests that the e¤ect of exposure on crime cumulative monopolistically
over time during the sample period.
Controlling US Exports to China: one potential concern to our baseline estimate is
that counties su¤ering much from Chinese import competition could also benet from exporting
heavily to China (e.g., jobs in exporting sectors). If exporting industries to China negatively
correlated with import competing industries across counties, then we may over estimate the
e¤ect of county exposure to Chinese import competition on crime. Following Autor, Dorn,
and Hanson (2013), to tackle this concern, we construct the following county net exposure to
Chinese import competition12 as our key independent variable,
Nc2000_2010= ln
"X
j
Ljc2000
Lj2000
import
US_China
j2000_2010  exportUS_Chinaj2000_2010
Lc2000
#
(2)
where exportUS_Chinaj2000_2010 is the change of US exports to China for industry j during the 2000-
2010 period. The estimation results using the newly constructed net exposure are reported in
the rst two columns of Table 7. We nd that the exposure e¤ect disappear for violent crime
once exporting to China is controlled for. However, we still observe a signicant and positive
e¤ect of Chinese import competition on property crime and its magnitude is much larger than
that for violent crime, 0.771 vs. 0.041.
Comparison to Other Low-income Countries: in order to check the di¤erence of
import competition between China and other low-income countries, we report estimation results
for the e¤ect of county exposure to other low-income countries on crime in columns 3-4 of Table
7. Interestingly, we nd that county exposure to import competition from low-income countries
does not have statistically signicant impact on crime, though the estimate has a positive sign.
This result is consistent with the fact that Chinese imports account for 89% of total imports
12Please refer to Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) why incorporating exporting is confusing due to China and
US occupying di¤erent positions in global value chain.
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from low-income countries (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013) and thus county exposure to
increased import competition in 2000-2010 period mainly stems from sudden increase of Chinese
imports.
Excluding Dominant Industries: during our sample period, labor-intensive product
exports play an dominant role in Chinese exports (Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei, 2013). One
may be worried that our main result is totally driven by these labor-intensive product imports.
To exclude this possibility, we run regressions by excluding apparel, footwear, and textiles
following Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013). The results shown in the last two columns of
Table 7 indicate that both estimates for violent- and property- crime become smaller (0.069
vs. 0.082; 0.593 vs. 1.035), suggesting the basic intuition that labor-intensive good imports
play an important role is right. Albeit, both estimates remain positive and highly signicant
and the exposure impact on property crime is still much larger than that on violent crime.
Individual Crime Categories: although we nd robust positive e¤ect of exposure to
Chinese import competition on two broadly dened crime categories, one may be interested
in looking at crime categories individually. To explore this, we re-estimate equation (1) by
changing the dependent variable to seven crime categories obtained from the original data. The
corresponding estimation results are reported in Table 8. The rst four columns correspond
to results of violent crime for Murder, Rape, Robbery and Assault respectively while the last
three columns are for property crime, i.e., Burglary, larceny, and motor theft. We nd that
within violent crime, robbery and assault are a¤ected more by Chinese import competition
(0.019 and 0.054) while rape are not a¤ected and the magnitude of estimate for murder is
relatively small, 0.002. This is understandable and consistent with our conjecture that the
main motive for crime caused by Chinese import competition are from nancial considerations.
Looking at results within property crime, we nd that the magnitude of estimate for Burglary
and Larceny is much larger than that for Motor vehicle theft, 0.251, 0.769 vs. 0.023. Again,
if the assumption of aggravated nancial pressure caused by Chinese import competition is
plausible (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and , 2014), this result is intuitive too because the "prot"
of Burglary and Larceny is modestly higher than motor vehicle theft (at least for expectation
before the action).
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4.6 Heterogeneous Response: Government Transfer
Theoretically, gains from trade outweigh the losses, i.e., although trade may hurt low-income
workers in various ways, the gains from trade to consumers and producers due to lower price
of imported goods and greater variety of inputs will insure that the net impact of trade to
a country is positive. In this case, to ensure a pareto improvement of trade liberalization on
all groups in the society, adoption of redistribution policies is critical. For example, if workers
su¤ering from Chinese import competition could be compensated by government redistribution
policies, the life pressure on them could be greatly alleviated which in turn will signicantly
decrease their motivations on crime.
To check this conjecture empirically, we expect that in counties with high level of govern-
ment transfer, the exposure e¤ect on crime should be signicantly lower than that in counties
with low government transfer.13 The corresponding estimation results are reported in Table 9,
with the rst two columns corresponding to a subsample of counties below government transfer
sample mean while the last two columns are results for a subsample of counties above govern-
ment transfer sample mean. We nd that there is no e¤ect of exposure on both violent- and
property- crime in the rst two columns. However, we detect a positive and signicant e¤ect
of exposure on crime in the last two columns; moreover, consistent with our baseline results,
the e¤ect of exposure on property crime is much larger than that for violent crime. These
results suggest that consistent with trade theory, redistribution is an e¤ect way in alleviating
the adverse impact of trade liberalization.
5 Conclusion
Recent studies have uncovered that import competition has signicant and negative e¤ect on
employment and wage of manufacture workers (see, e.g., Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013;
Balsvik, Jensen, and Salvanes, 2015). In this paper, we go one step further by examining
the e¤ect of county exposure to Chinese import competition on Crime in US. Following the
same identication strategy of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), our empirical results indicate
13Government transfer data is obtained from BEA.
18
that counties with high import competition from China su¤er from high crime rates. We
conduct various robustness checks showing that our results are not inuenced by assumption
in the exclusion assumption, alternate sample periods, outliers, and US exports to China.
Interestingly, we nd that counties with large government transfer are less likely to be inuenced
by Chinese import competition.
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                                 Table 1A: Summary Statistics  
 
Variable Observations Mean S.D. Min Max 
Violent Crime Change 3059 -0.98 21.55 -629.46 140.21 
Property Crime Change 3059 -9.98 107.12 -1571.43 488.03 
Exposure 3068 357.08 25.58 0 606.06 
Police 3059 30.21 83.08 0 3486.32 
Unemployment Rate 3067 4.34 1.64 1.39 17.43 
Pct 18_25 3066 8.85 3.45 2.5 41.7 
Pct Black 3066 8.66 14.48 0 86.1 
Pct Bachelor 3066 10.94 4.92 0 40 
Per Capita Income 3023 0.34 1.24 0.001 49.72 
Government Transfer 3031 0.35 1.17 0.0002 36.60 
Population 3068 0.89 2.90 0 95.19 
Notes: this table provides summary statistics for variables used in the baseline 
regression. Violent Crime Change and Property Crime Change are defined as the 
difference of relevant variables between 2000 and 2010 while Exposure denotes 
county exposure to Chinese import competition during the same period. Police, Pct 
18_25, Pct Black, Pct Bachelor, Per Capita Income, Government Welfare, and 
Population are at the initial period level (2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
           Table 1B: Summary Statistics, Sample for Top 20% of County Exposure 
 
Variable Observations Mean S.D. Min Max 
Violent Crime Change 616 0.43 18.04 -78.64 140.21 
Property Crime Change 616 -3.33 94.78 -302.07 488.03 
Exposure 621 392.27 28.58 370.26 606.06 
Police 616 26.29 25.44 2.81 524.74 
Unemployment Rate 620 4.34 1.63 1.41 17.43 
Pct 18_25 620 9.20 3.57 4 34 
Pct Black 620 10.17 15.05 0 84.7 
Pct Bachelor 620 11.47 5.65 3.1 32.8 
Per Capita Income 603 0.35 0.89 0.003 16.14 
Government Transfer 607 0.66 2.24 0.003 36.60 
Population 621 1.54 5.38 0 95.19 
Notes: this table provides summary statistics for sample of top 20% of county 
exposure. Violent Crime Change and Property Crime Change are defined as the 
difference of relevant variables between 2000 and 2010 while Exposure denotes 
county exposure to Chinese import competition during the same period. Police, Pct 
18_25, Pct Black, Pct Bachelor, Per Capita Income, Government Welfare, and 
Population are at the initial period level (2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Table 1C: Summary Statistics, Sample for Bottom 20% of County Exposure 
 
Variable Observations Mean S.D. Min Max 
Violent Crime Change 610 -1.52 18.90 -130.25 128.23 
Property Crime Change 610 -15.57 102.28 -597.02 349.03 
Exposure 611 332.26 18.45 0 339.43 
Police 610 28.54 31.63 2.21 498.66 
Unemployment Rate 611 4.55 1.96 1.48 16.82 
Pct 18_25 610 7.77 2.73 2.5 41.7 
Pct Black 610 6.54 14.10 0 84.3 
Pct Bachelor 610 10.23 4.30 0 36.6 
Per Capita Income 604 0.22 0.17 0.002 2.22 
Government Transfer 605 0.07 0.16 0.0002 3.59 
Population 611 0.20 0.51 0 8.44 
Notes: this table provides summary statistics for sample of bottom 20% of county 
exposure. Violent Crime Change and Property Crime Change are defined as the 
difference of relevant variables between 2000 and 2010 while Exposure denotes 
county exposure to Chinese import competition during the same period. Police, Pct 
18_25, Pct Black, Pct Bachelor, Per Capita Income, Government Welfare, and 
Population are at the initial period level (2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              Table 2: First Stage Estimates, 2000-2010 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Dependent variable is county exposure 
to Chinese import competition 
Variable of Interest   
IV 0.230*** 0.230*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Initial Crime -0.012 -0.001 
 (0.014) (0.003) 
Police -0.004* -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment Rate 0.400 0.395 
 (0.297) (0.297) 
Pct 18_25 0.137 0.141 
 (0.119) (0.120) 
Black 0.031 0.027 
 (0.034) (0.032) 
Education 0.360*** 0.367*** 
 (0.109) (0.111) 
Per Capita Income 0.194 0.186 
 (0.257) (0.255) 
Population -0.484 -0.507 
 (0.553) (0.552) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 223.969*** 224.219*** 
Shea Partial R Square 0.191 0.191 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 335.631* 335.773* 
R-Square 0.211 0.211 
Observations 3,022 3,022 
Notes: white’s standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 
percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Table 3: Country Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Crime, 2SLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Dependent variable is change of 
violent crime, 2000-2010 
Dependent variables is change of 
property crime, 2000-2010 
Variable of Interest       
Exposure 0.057** 0.130*** 0.082*** 0.631*** 1.221*** 1.035*** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.157) (0.146) (0.144) 
Initial Crime  -0.541*** -0.606***  -0.436*** -0.457*** 
  (0.083) (0.087)  (0.021) (0.025) 
Unemployment Rate   0.005**   0.010 
   (0.002)   (0.012) 
Police   0.742***   1.019 
   (0.226)   (1.071) 
Pct 18_25   0.365***   2.588*** 
   (0.088)   (0.515) 
Black   0.226***   0.679*** 
   (0.062)   (0.153) 
Education   0.016   -1.520*** 
   (0.080)   (0.433) 
Per Capita Income   -0.467   -1.888 
   (0.397)   (2.301) 
Population   0.609*   1.954** 
   (0.313)   (0.966) 
DWH-Test (p) 1.05 13.85*** 3.96** 10.25*** 57.20*** 38.70*** 
R-Square 0.002 0.44 0.49 0.003 0.35 0.39 
F Statistic 4.01** 23.93*** 20.52*** 16.20*** 214.26*** 95.12*** 
Observations 3,059 3,059 3,022 3,059 3,059 3,022 
Notes: white’s standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 
percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               Table 4: Falsification Tests, 2SLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Period: 1992-2000 Period: 1994-2000 Period: 1996-2000 
VARIABLES Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
Variable of Interest       
Exposure (2000-2010) -0.002 0.282 -0.010* 0.156 -0.006 0.214 
 (0.006) (0.173) (0.006) (0.167) (0.006) (0.161) 
Initial Crime -0.475*** -0.394*** -0.435*** -0.404*** -0.365*** -0.371***
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Square 0.54 0.42 0.49 0.37 0.32 0.32 
F Statistic 106.93*** 122.36*** 106.61*** 87.84*** 34.22*** 59.05***
Observations 3,018 3,018 3,019 3,019 3,021 3,021 
Notes: white’s standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 
percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5: Check for IV Validity, 2SLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
VARIABLES Subsample: excluding steel, 
flat glass, and cement  
Subsample: excluding 
computers 
Variable of Interest     
Exposure 0.076*** 1.018*** 0.018*** 0.250*** 
 (0.026) (0.145) (0.006) (0.033) 
Initial Crime -0.604*** -0.456*** -0.607*** -0.464*** 
 (0.087) (0.025) (0.087) (0.025) 
Controls Yes Yes        Yes Yes 
DWH-Test (p) 4.00** 37.45*** 2.84* 35.79*** 
R-Square 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.40 
F Statistic 363.22*** 264.18*** 363.83*** 265.35*** 
Observations 3,022 3,022 2,995 2,995 
Notes: white’s standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 
percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                             Table 6: Alternative Sample Periods, 2SLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 2000-2008 period 2000-2006 period 2000-2004 period 2000-2002 period 
VARIABLES Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
Variable of Interest         
Exposure 0.013** 0.637*** 0.019*** 0.585*** 0.018*** 0.383** 0.015** 0.238* 
 (0.006) (0.148) (0.005) (0.113) (0.006) (0.158) (0.006) (0.139) 
Initial Crime -0.343*** -0.358*** -0.330*** -0.308*** -0.352*** -0.230*** -0.303*** -0.172*** 
 (0.109) (0.039) (0.111) (0.039) (0.107) (0.043) (0.114) (0.045) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Square 4.37*** 43.87*** 5.21*** 24.7*** 5.80*** 17.07*** 3.63*** 5.76*** 
F Statistic 0.19 0.26 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.12 
Observations 3,022 3,022 3,022 3,022 3,022 3,022 3,022 3,022 
Notes: white’s standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant 
at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      Table 7: Other Robustness Checks, 2SLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Accounting for county 
exports to China 
Import Competition from 
low-income countries 
Excluding apparel, 
footwear, and textiles 
VARIABLES Violent 
Crime 
Property 
Crime 
Violent 
Crime 
Property 
Crime 
Violent 
Crime 
Property 
Crime 
       
Net Exposure 0.041 0.771***     
 (0.037) (0.205)     
Exposure   0.185 1.240 0.069*** 0.593*** 
   (0.205) (1.638) (0.016) (0.086) 
Initial Crime -0.607*** -0.454*** -0.608*** -0.455*** -0.608*** -0.462*** 
 (0.087) (0.025) (0.087) (0.025) (0.087) (0.025) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Square 0.49 0.41 0.48 0.40 0.41 0.49 
F Statistic 17.71*** 86.52*** 17.36*** 85.84*** 86.04*** 18.68*** 
Observations 3,022 3,022 3,022 3,022 3,022 3,022 
            Notes: white’s standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the  
5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  Table 8: Individual Crime Categories, 2SLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Motor Theft
Variable of Interest        
Exposure 0.002** 0.006 0.019*** 0.054** 0.251*** 0.769*** 0.023** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.023) (0.047) (0.102) (0.011) 
Initial Crime -0.853*** -0.589*** -0.472*** -0.638*** -0.408*** -0.484*** -0.547***
 (0.048) (0.028) (0.121) (0.072) (0.032) (0.024) (0.015) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Square 0.59 0.31 0.44 0.49 0.23 0.44 0.66 
F Statistic 40.55*** 73.72*** 11.38*** 20.46*** 37.94*** 92.64*** 173.68***
Observations 3,022 3,022 3,022 3,022 3,022 3,022 3,022 
               Notes: white’s standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant  
at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          Table 9: Role of Government Transfer 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Above Sample Mean Below Sample Mean 
VARIABLES Violent 
Crime 
Property 
Crime 
Violent 
Crime 
Property 
Crime 
Variable of Interest     
Exposure 0.011 0.056 0.073** 1.070*** 
 (0.052) (0.295) (0.030) (0.164) 
Initial Crime -0.445*** -0.502*** -0.668*** -0.489*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.090) (0.031) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Square 0.48 0.61 0.52 0.37 
F Statistic 27.85*** 36.61*** 13.81*** 67.79*** 
Observations 542 542 2,480 2,480 
Notes: white’s standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     Figure 1: Chinese Imports in U.S., 1991-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
                           Figure 2A: Times Series of Murder 
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                       Figure 2B: Time Series of Rape 
 
 
 
                       Table 2C: Time Series of Robbery 
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Figure 2D: Time Series of Assault 
 
 
 
                                 Figure 2E: Time Series of Burglary 
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                             Figure 2F: Time Series of Larceny 
 
 
 
                         Figure 2G: Time Series of Motor Theft 
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